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Security is hard, and teaching security can be even harder. Here we describe a public educational activity to 
assist in the instruction of both students and developers in 
creating secure Android apps. Our set of activities includes 
example vulnerable applications, information about each 
vulnerability, steps on how to repair the vulnerabilities, and 
information about how to confirm that the vulnerability 
has been properly repaired. Our primary goal is to make 
these activities available to other instructors for use in their 
classrooms ranging from the K-12 to university settings. A 
secondary goal of this project is to foster interest in security 
and computing. All project activities may be found on the 
project website [2]. 
The mobile revolution has allowed anyone with a basic 
understanding of development to upload their applications 
(“apps”) to an app store, making them available to millions of 
potential users. With extreme openness comes great danger—
inexperienced developers have the capability to create vulnera-
ble apps that can negatively affect millions of users. Additional-
ly, experienced developers can and do make mistakes due to the 
challenging nature of creating secure software.
Developers inadvertently create vulnerable software for a wide 
range of reasons— simple errors, ignorance of how to create se-
cure apps, or a lack of understanding of the importance of secure 
app development. In order to help educate developers about the 
importance of secure app development as well as how to create 
secure apps, we have created a public sample set of vulnerable An-
droid apps. Each example contains a clear demonstration of the 
negative ramifications of the vulnerability, steps to repair the vul-
nerability, and posted actions to ensure that it has been resolved.
We have two primary goals for the project. First, we believe 
that it’s important to educate Android developers about the 
specific example vulnerabilities in our study. Second, we aim 
to demonstrate the importance of security on a more general 
level for the extremely diverse set of Android developers. We 
would like developers of all experience levels to become more 
interested in security through hands-on examples.
There were two primary concerns which lead us to create 
this repository:
•  Development Effort. Creating activities, especially those 
with vulnerabilities can be a long and difficult process—
something which many instructors do not have the 
necessary resources to build. The availability of these 
activities frees instructors to do what they do best, teach. 
Additionally, since these activities will be refined through 
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Activities begin with providing the user some background 
about the specific vulnerability being targeted—when, why, 
and how the vulnerability may occur. Whenever possible, stu-
dents are also provided with a real-world example of occur-
rences of the vulnerability such as where they occurred in spe-
cific apps. Also included are some basic reasons about why the 
vulnerability occurs and common developer mistakes which 
lead to the vulnerability.
Each activity has an associated app which contains an in-
stance of the discussed vulnerability. These apps—created 
specifically for these exercises—are typically very simple, hav-
ing the sole intention of conveying the example vulnerability. 
Using the provided instruction set, students are able to recre-
ate the vulnerability, demonstrating its possible negative ram-
ifications. In some cases, activities also utilize free, third party 
tools such as Fiddler [1] to provide visibility of the vulnera-
bilities or to later demonstrate that the vulnerability has been 
repaired. Figure 2 demonstrates an example of a third-party 
app inappropriately accessing message data from another app, 
and Figure 3 is a developer-side demonstration of another 
vulnerability—both would be part of an included vulnerability 
demonstration workflow.
regular usage, instructors can be more confident that any 
issues have already been resolved.
•  Required Skillset. Teaching students and developers 
to create secure software is a difficult process. Not all 
instructors teaching mobile development are expected to be 
adequately prepared to create a diverse, informative set of 
activities such as ours. 
Our project has several goals.
•  Ease of use. All activities should be usable ‘out of the box’ by 
instructors. Additionally, students and developers working 
through the activities on their own should be able to do so 
with as few roadblocks as possible due to the documentation 
and clear instruction sets provided with each of the activities.
•  Relevance. We have found that creating relevant, real-world 
projects helps to foster student interest in the activity and 
in security. Each of our activities contains relevant examples 
from the commercial apps, including steps to recreate the 
vulnerability and demonstrate its relevance.
•  Meet a diverse range of skillsets. Not all students or devel-
opers are at the same skill level, and security is important 
to all experience and skill levels. Additionally, anyone can 
learn about security and mobile development from elemen-
tary-age to retirees. Our activities are designed to assist 
students and developers of all experience levels and ages. 
We have created ten publicly available activities that can be 
found on our project website [2]. This list will continue to grow, 
both through our own efforts as well as submissions from the 
external sources. Our apps were created by an experienced An-
droid developer with over 1 million app downloads in the Goo-
gle Play store, and more in other app marketplaces.
ACTIVITIES
Although our list of activities is growing, we currently have ten 
vulnerability examples ranging from basic examples as proper 
intent protection to more complicated activities such as correct 
use of content providers. The process outline of each activity is 
outlined in Figure 1.
Each of the exercises contains:
•  mobile apps which contain well-defined vulnerabilities;
•  documentation about the adverse effects of the 
vulnerabilities and how they may be exploited;
•  step-by-step documentation on how to repair the 
vulnerabilities, along with their rationale; and
•  instructions for how to verify that the vulnerability has  
been repaired
Figure 1: App Repair Process
Repair Processs
Vulnerable App Secure App
Verification Process
Verified Secure App
Figure 2: Example of Vulnerability Demonstration
Figure 3: Example of Vulnerability Demonstration Using Fiddler
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party could create an overwhelming number of 
(HTTP) requests directed towards a specific server. 
The environments must be managed to make them less 
vulnerable to these types of attacks.
•  Ad Libraries (Advanced). In-app advertisements (“ads”) 
libraries are able to use all of the permissions given to the 
app which contains the ad library, even the people who did 
not give this permission to the ad library itself. This can 
open up various security and privacy issues within the app 
including ad libraries collecting sensitive user information 
such as locations or contact info.
•  Content Providers (Advanced). Content providers share 
data between apps, and any app in the system can access 
the “content providers” database. Because of this, data 
stored here must be kept secure and encrypted so that it 
can only be read by an authorized app. 
Although there are many more families of Android vulner-
abilities, we have initially selected these for several reasons in-
cluding their prevalence in existing apps, their ease of demon-
stration, and their potential for negative ramifications.
CONCLUSION
We have created a publicly available instruction set of vulnerable 
Android apps which includes ten groups of vulnerabilities. Our 
goal is for instructors to adopt these activities in a diverse set of 
courses, allowing users of varying experience levels to examine, 
demonstrate, and repair common Android vulnerabilities. All 
course materials can be found on our project website [2].  
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 The user is then provided with information on how to repair 
the vulnerability, which includes any relevant code snippets and 
proper information about how the introduced new (defensive) 
coding practices protect against the vulnerability. Our docu-
mentation also provides clear steps on how to repair the vul-
nerability within the provided app.
The final step has the user attempt to re-test whether the 
vulnerability still remains within the app (i.e., the vulnerability 
should no longer exist). The concluding portion of the activity 
provides several important benefits to the user including 
demonstrating the importance and proper procedures of 
basic security testing, providing a sense of accomplishment 
for the user. 
Here are some of the activities, along with their anticipated ex-
perience/difficulty level.
•  Activities Access (Beginner). Security issues arise when 
people try to access specific unauthorized activities. An 
example could be a bank app where users try to access a 
balance management activity without properly logging into 
the system.
•  Intent Protection (Beginner). Android uses “intents” to pass 
data between apps, for examples between the Facebook and 
Facebook Messenger apps. Data passing between these apps 
may be easily (and improperly) read by other apps. This 
module explains how to protect information being sent via 
intents between apps.
•  XML (Beginner). Since XML is very easy to read using 
reverse engineering, it is best to avoid saving important 
information such as Ads code or Map Code within XML 
files.
•  Android Javascript (Medium). This activity demonstrates 
the negative implications of using JavaScript in Webview 
to pass data from an Android app to a server. This is 
considered bad practice because anyone could use 
malicious JavaScript code on their website to gain private 
user information associated with the app. 
•  Broadcast (Medium). Broadcast data sent by the app is 
easy to access from any other app in the system, so when 
Broadcasting to specific apps, the data should be encrypted. 
Intercepted unencrypted Broadcasts could lead to serious 
security and privacy issues. 
•  Data Storage (Medium). When an app does not secure 
storage data such as data files, shared references, and 
databases (i.e., SQLite), it has the potential to be read by any 
other app. This means that important information stored 
in these files (such as a database connection information) 
should be encrypted.
•  Data Over HTTP (Medium). Data that moves over an 
unencrypted HTTP (internet) connection is vulnerable 
to “Man in the Middle” attacks. One example of this is 
credit card information, which if passed over an unsecure 
connection, could be intercepted midstream. 
•  DOS (Medium). Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are a 
common problem with Android, because a malicious 
